Features

When Iran’s influential former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani recently hailed the Shi’ite Muslim militia of wanted Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr as “heroic,” he might have been signaling that Iran is finally coming out from behind the scenes in the confrontation between the U.S. and al-Sadr that has left dozens dead. 

The U.S.-led coalition has said the main reason it has issued an arrest warrant for al-Sadr is because he is wanted for the murder of another Shi’ite cleric, al-Khoei, in the holy city of Najaf last year. But that line has few takers in Iraq. A survey of Arab television reveals a deep-seated suspicion about the real motives behind the arrest warrant. Ordinary Iraqis quoted on television wonder why the warrant came from Baghdad and not Najaf where the murder actually took place. And they point out that the murder happened last year. So why issue an arrest warrant for that now? 

The answer might lie in Tehran, Iran, which has huge influence on the Shi’ites in Iraq. The Shi’ites in Iraq are not unified. They can be divided into two groups—the moderates and hardliners. The moderates who want to work with the United States are led by Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim, who is a member of the Iraqi Governing Council. The hardliners, led by the likes of Muqtada al-Sadr, are opposed to the coalition forces and make no secret about wanting the Americans to leave Iraq.  

This split mirrors in many ways the tension between reformists and conservatives in Iran as well. But in the recent elections in Iran, the reformists—led by President Khatami—were outmaneuvered and defeated by the conservatives who ally with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Though the means were dubious since many reformist candidates were banned from running, the end result has been a strengthening of the conservatives’ power in Iran. Now they are able to come out more openly in support of al-Sadr. Previously when they had invited al-Sadr to Iran, President Khatami had refused to meet him, though he had met with the moderate al-Hakim. 

The hardliners have always supported al-Sadr because they agree ideologically. Both distrust the United States and do not wish to enter into deals with the Americans. They also would like the U.S. to be stuck in the Iraqi quagmire so as to make sure that it does not put Iran on its hit list next. 

What has been worrying the U.S. lately is that the increased Iranian support to the Shi’ites led by al-Sadr could actually lead to a transnational Shi’ite alliance hostile to Washington. The militant group Hizbollah in Southern Lebanon has already thrown its support behind al-Sadr, who responded by saying he would be their “striking hand in Iraq.” The U.S. has been watching these developments in alarm because they did not go into Iraq to create Iran Number 2.  

Paul Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority administrator, probably hoped that by taking on Muqtada al-Sadr, he could nip this alliance in the bud, send a strong message to Tehran, and empower the moderate Shi’tes like the ones on the governing council. By issuing an arrest warrant, he is hoping to force Shi’ites in Iraq to make a choice. But the choice may not be so easy to make. Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani is the figure many Iraqi Shi’ites are looking to for direction. There has historically been bad blood between al-Sistani and al-Sadr’s father who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s regime. But al-Sadr has already declared his own allegiance to al-Sistani, who will not want to come out openly against al-Sadr, Iran and Hizbollah. So he has been issuing ambiguous statements that call for calm but also criticize the American forces. 

While the final outcome might still depend on al-Sistani, the increasing confrontation between the U.S. and al-Sadr’s Imam Mehdi army shows Bremer may have underestimated al-Sadr as no more than a young firebrand with limited support. The danger in igniting this confrontation is that it raises the possibility of Iraq’s majority Shi’ites reaching out to the Sunnis who have already been fighting the coalition forces in places like Fallujah. There are already signs that this is happening as residents of dominantly Sunni Fallujah tell al Alam television, an Arabic news channel out of Tehran, that they view al-Sadr as a political hero that the U.S. is trying to silence him by shutting down al Hawza newspaper which supported him.  

But the biggest danger is that the turmoil will allow hardliners in Iran to openly take up a prominent position in the unfolding drama. If it declares its full support to al-Sadr, it could be the key that would help him come out on top of the struggle between the conservatives and the moderates for control of Iraq.›