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Editor: 

While peace talks between the Colombian government and the country's largest insurgency group entered into a critical moment last month, some US policymakers asserted their support for US military aid to Colombia to be used in counterinsurgency efforts.  

Currently the 1.28 billion dollars in military aid allocated for 2000, 2001, and 2002 can only be used for explicitly counter-narcotic operations. Allocating even more money for counterinsurgency use would mean slipping further into the quagmire of an endless guerrilla war. Yet there is no proof that a counterinsurgency effort would ever bring peace and stability to this Andean nation.  

A critical look at history points to a need for a politically negotiated settlement that incorporates the concerns of civil society and addresses the root causes of war. Washington needs to change its tone or chance damaging the peace process further. 

On the surface it may appear logical that the Colombian military, given enough assistance, training, and arms from the United States, could effectively quash the major rebel groups. However, Colombian history seems to indicate that lasting peace will require more than a firm hand. Since at least the early 1800s, when colonists led by Simón Bolivar won independence from Spain, Colombia has found itself embroiled in civil war more often than not.  

Spates of violence between peasant groups have wracked the country time and again, with the result almost always being a brief cease-fire until the next match is thrown into the tinderbox because the underlying issues are not addressed.  

The nature of the current conflict also creates a powerful disincentive to fight it militarily. The insurgents are largely Colombian peasants who inhabit the vast jungle or mountainous terrain. Their most effective weapons are not sophisticated missiles or expensive helicopters but crude bombs made from household gas tanks. To “win” this counterinsurgency war would require such draconian civilian repression by the state and its armed forces that it would effectively sow the seeds of the next insurgency group. Colombian peace advocates point to the last time there was a major counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia under the “soft dictatorship” of Rojas Pinilla in the 1950's. Rather than bringing lasting peace, that era of counterinsurgency led to the founding of both major guerrilla groups currently active in Colombia, the FARC and the ELN. 

So why do some policymakers in DC want to increase US military aid and involvement in Colombia's internal conflict? Numerous actors have influenced the debate, including defense manufacturers that profit from increased military aid, international oil companies that own most of the oil fields in Colombia, and the Colombian military itself. Just last week General Fernando Tapias, the head of the Colombian military, returned from a low-profile trip to DC in which he met with Condaleeza Rice and other high-level defense department officials. In addition to legitimate concerns about the efficacy of strengthening the Colombian military, there is a question as to whether the US should be funding a military that both  

the US State Department and Human Rights Watch have documented as having close connections to a terrorist organization, the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Although the term “terrorist” has perhaps been over-used recently, the AUC paramilitary is clearly responsible for numerous, horrific atrocities against unarmed civilians. 

While the debate in DC continues to center around military options, a coalition of six governors from southern Colombia has proposed an alternate plan, one that focuses on economic and social solutions to the conflict. A viable economic and social solution, designed by local governments and civil society aware of community needs, may just be what Colombia needs to put an end to a long history of violence. It is no coincidence that the most tranquil moments in Colombian history have come during periods of equitable economic boom. The growth of the coffee industry in the early 20th century is indicative of the trend.  

By providing the small farmer a profitable cash crop, coffee helped to create the broadest economic prosperity that Colombia has known-and also the longest stretch of peace in its history. Since then, coffee prices have plummeted, local markets have been “globalized,” and the results are an ever widening gap between the rich and the poor and increased violence throughout the country. 

A military approach to curbing the violence in Colombia has failed in every attempt. Now is the time to consider locally designed economic and social solutions. 

Kirk Jorgensen