Features

On Jan. 30 there will be national elections in Iraq. Insurgent violence will keep many Iraqis from voting and, as a result, some groups, particularly the Sunnis, will be under-represented in the new Assembly. Nonetheless, Jan. 30 represents a milestone f or the U.S. occupation, and, therefore, an opportunity for Americans to assess our prospects, to question our plan going forward. 

After the Iraqi election, there are three broad paths that the occupation might follow: America can continue with the Bush p lan to hang tough until the insurgency is defeated and Iraq enjoys a true democracy. Or, we could summarily declare victory and withdraw from Iraq. Finally, the U.S. occupation might take a radically different form—for example, by convincing the UN or NAT O to play a bigger role—one that would lead to a diminished role for our forces. 

This analysis considers the first of these scenarios, where America stays the course. 

In November, more than 60 million voters reelected George W. Bush; for many the pivota l reason was their belief that he is resolute, someone who says what he means. If Bush keeps to his word on Iraq—the U.S. will stay until it eliminates all the insurgents—then the results of the elections will bring little immediate change; the violence w ill continue unabated. 

The status quo is likely to hold for several months. Then, there might possibly be a substantial troop withdrawal, as most observers expect that the new Iraqi government, dominated by the Shiite majority, will ask for a quick end t o the occupation. The Bush administration could seize upon this as an opportunity to scale back military operations, regardless of internal conditions in Iraq and the readiness of newly trained security forces. 

Unfortunately, the most probable outcome of the Jan. 30 elections is a full-scale civil war, one where Iraqis who are now united in fighting the U.S., instead begin to fight each other. It seems improbable that America would withdraw in the midst of such chaos; or that we would abandon the Kurdish minority who occupy much of northern Iraq, as this would leave them open to invasion by Turkey. Further, the U.S. has constructed approximately a dozen “enduring” military bases in Iraq; it is unlikely that we would abandon these or simply cloister our troops inside them. 

Rather than withdraw, the Bush administration will probably muddle onward with an occupation dominated by American troops; we will continue to recruit and train Iraqi security forces, but, for the foreseeable future, our soldiers will engage in the worst fighting. 

However, many observers feel that the scope of the conflict might widen with an invasion and occupation of Iran and Syria. One of the excuses that the administration has given for their failure in Iraq is that large numbers of terrorists and weapons daily move across its mostly unsecured borders. An invasion of Iran and Syria might destroy terrorist staging areas and, in the eyes of the Bush administration, have the additional advantage of destabilizing governments that have been severe critics of the occupation. Further, an enlargement of the conflict would divert the American public from the failures of the occupation by shifting attention to what the U.S. military is good at—overwhelming infidels by means of superior tech nology. 

Of course, a strategy of expanding the scope of the occupation to include neighboring states has many possible negative consequences: our Iraq experience has proved that the American military is not an effective occupying force, and the expansion of our reach would further dramatize this (and continue to weaken our homeland security). Such a military action would, no doubt, find the United States acting alone; America would have to shoulder the entire cost of the operation, both in dollars and in casualties. Moreover, such an extreme example of U.S. unilateralism would have a profound affect on the international community; it would further alienate us from great powers such as China and Russia, and our traditional allies in Europe and Japan. At t he least, this would affect important diplomatic efforts and, most likely, have severe economic consequences, such as a rise in oil prices, further devaluation of the dollar, and a spike in interest rates. Lastly, a widening of the American presence in th e Middle East would further fuel the flames of anti-Americanism in the Arab world and strengthen support for the terrorist movement that we are trying to extinguish. 

At the moment, it seems most likely that after the formation of a new Iraqi govern ment, the occupation will muddle on as before, with an inexorable increase in American costs and casualties. This is the Bush “plan” that military experts allude to when they describe our involvement as going on for 10 or more years; operating under heavy administration censorship, they don’t put a price tag on this, but at roughly $100 billion per year, the occupation might cost more than $1 trillion. 

It’s the dreadful cost of this war, in lives and dollars, and in the loss of America’s integrity, that motivates progressives to search for a way out. 

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